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Abstract: I extend DeGraba’s model of buying frenzies. I identify conditions under
which buying frenzies are the only possible equilibrium and under which rationing occurs
in equilibrium.
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1Buying frenzies occur when some consumers rush to buy a product while those who
wait are rationed out. Such phenomena happen, for example, in ticket concerts (Courty,
2004) and for the launch of some new products (DeGraba,1995). DeGraba argues that a
candidate explanation is that consumers discover new information about their willingness
to pay over time. A monopolist may create a buying frenzy to make sure that consumers
buy before they become informed. DeGraba’s main contribution is to identify conditions
under which buying frenzies are the only possible equilibrium outcome. I derive two new
results. First, I show that DeGraba’s analysis does not hold when consumer valuations
take continuous values. Second, one can restore DeGraba’s results if one assumes that
the monopolist may receive, in the event a frenzy does not take place, an outside option
for the unsold production. A new implication is that rationing occurs only if the outside
option is low or uncertain.
1 Model
The model is pictured in Figure 1. There are two periods. On the demand side, there
is a continuum of N consumers with unit demands. In period 1, consumers have the
same expected valuations ￿. Consumers privately learn their valuations in period 2.
Consumer valuations are identically and independently distributed with cumulative dis-
tribution F(:) and density f(:). F and f are continuous functions with support [vL;vH]
and
R vH
vL vf(v)dv = ￿. This demand speci￿cation is an approximation of a large market
where consumers have idiosyncratic preferences that are discovered over time (Lewis and
Sappington, 1994). On the supply side, a monopolist chooses output Q in period 1 and
cannot produce more units in period 2. The marginal cost of production is M ￿ vL. The
monopolist then sets the period 1 price p1 and consumers can either buy or wait. If all
output is sold at the end of period 1, the game ends. If no sale takes place in period
1, the producer receives with probability ￿ outside o￿er w for the unsold production. If
the monopolist receives and accepts the o￿er, the game ends. Otherwise, the monopo-
list sets the period 2 price p2. Those consumers who have not yet bought may buy. For
simplicity, the monopolist and consumers are risk-neutral and do not discount. In the
event of excess demand, consumers are served according to a rationing rule that is left
unspeci￿ed. I assume that v >
1￿F(v)
f(v) for v 2 [vL;vH]. I could replace this assumption
with the assumption that the monopolist faces a Coase commitment problem in period 2.
2Either assumption imply that the monopolist sells all leftover units in period 2. Finally,
I make the technical assumption that (at most) mass ￿ of consumer may coordinate their
decisions where ￿ can be arbitrarily small. The role of this assumption, which would hold
in a discrete version of the model with N consumers, will become clear in the proof of
proposition 2.
The case ￿ = 0 is a straightforward extension of DeGraba’s model to continuous
distributions of valuations. The novel part of my setup is the feature that the monopolist
may receive an outside o￿er in period 2 (case ￿ > 0). Illustrations can easily be found. If
the monopolist is a concert promoter, for example, it may be possible to cancel the event
and to recoup part of the ￿xed cost. In the application to new product development, the
monopolist may be able to sell the project to a third party or to direct unsold output to
a di￿erent geographic market.
I focus on subgame perfect equilibrium. An equilibrium is a sextuplet (Q;p1;r1;k;p2;r2)
where r1 is a function that maps Q and p1 for each consumer into a reservation price in
period one, k 2 f0;1g and p2 map all possible outcomes up to the beginning of period
2 into a decision to cancel the project (k = 1) and a period 2 price, and r2 maps for
each consumer all possible outcomes, including the realization of the consumer’s valua-
tion, into a reservation price in period 2. Following DeGraba, I say that a buying frenzy
equilibrium occurs if sales take place only in period 1, a ‘safe’ buying frenzy equilibrium
occurs if in addition there is a unique subgame perfect continuation equilibrium after
announcement (Q;p1), a market clearing equilibrium if sales take place only in period 2,
and an asymmetric equilibrium if some sales take place in both periods.
In period 2, there is no aggregate uncertainty. N(1 ￿ F(p)) consumers are willing
to pay at least p. A lower bound on the monopoly pro￿ts is the market clearing pro￿ts
￿MC = max
p N(1 ￿ F(p))(p ￿ M). The monopolist could also earn more in a buying
frenzy equilibrium. Questions of interest are: (a) Is it possible that only buying frenzies
are equilibrium outcomes? That is, can the monopolist earn more than ￿MC in any
equilibrium? (b) Are there safe buying frenzy equilibrium? (c) Does rationing always
take place in a safe buying frenzy equilibrium? The answer to these questions can be
positive in DeGraba’s setup (￿ = 0 and discrete valuations). Proposition 1 (￿ = 0) shows
that these results do not hold with continuous valuations. Propositions 2 and 3 show that
the answer can again be positive when ￿ > 0.
32 Analysis
Consider the case ￿ = 0. S2(q;n) is the subgame that starts at the beginning of period
2 when n consumers have not bought and there is q unsold units. Since v >
1￿F(v)
f(v) , it is
always optimal for the monopolist to sell all units. n(1 ￿ F(p)) consumers are willing to














S1(Q;p1) denotes the subgame that takes place after the monopolist has set Q and p1.
Proposition 1: In any S1(Q;p1) such that Q ￿ N and Q(p1 ￿ M) ￿ ￿MC, there exists
a market clearing continuation equilibrium if ￿ = 0.
Proof: Consider the following continuation equilibrium: r1 < p1, p2 = p2(Q;N), and
r2 = p2. I only need to show that r1 is a best reply. Since Q(p1 ￿ M) ￿ ￿MC =
max
q q(p2(q;N)￿M) ￿ Q(p2(Q;N)￿M), I have p1 ￿ p2(Q;N). A best reply for consumers
to set r1 < p1 since ￿ ￿ p1 ￿ ￿ ￿ p2(Q;N) ￿ U2(Q;N).2
Proposition 1 implies that the answer to questions (a) and (b) is negative: There is
no safe buying frenzy equilibrium and the market clearing equilibrium (p1 = p2 = vL,
r1 < p1, k = 0, r2 = p2) with payo￿ ￿MC always exists. The monopolist cannot rule
out this equilibrium because this would imply lowering prices too much. In fact, the
monopolist has to o￿er consumers a utility from buying early that is greater than the
highest possible utility they can get by waiting. For a given Q, the highest price the
monopolist can charge to rule out the market clearing equilibrium is p1 = ￿ ￿ U2(Q;N).
But the monopolist can do better under market clearing since p2(Q;N) ￿ ￿ ￿ U2(Q;N).
Proposition 1 reaches an opposite conclusion from DeGraba’s analysis that shows
that it is possible that ‘every subgame perfect equilibrium is a buying-frenzy equilibrium’
(Proposition 3, page 337). DeGraba’s conclusion rests on the fact that, in contrast with
Proposition 1, the market clearing equilibrium can be ruled out in his setup, and this is
driven by the combination of two speci￿c features of his model. First, period 2’s valuations
4can take only a ￿nite number of values (2 in his model). This makes the period 2 inverse
demand a step function. At the equilibrium period 2’s price, a positive mass of consumers
is indi￿erent between purchasing and not doing so. Second, DeGraba assumes that all
indi￿erent consumers actually demand the good and he considers a rationing rule that
results in ine￿cient allocations. Under continuous distribution, however, the goods are
e￿ciently allocated in period 2 and it is never optimal to eliminate the market clearing
equilibrium.
Consider next the case ￿ > 0. (CT) is the ex-post cancellation threat that the
monopolist weakly prefers to cancel the project in S2(q;N) when she receives an outside
o￿er,
w ￿ qp2(q;N) (CT)
(IGC) is the incentive constraint that consumers prefer to buy than to wait as a group
in S1(Q;p1)
￿ ￿ p1 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U2(Q;N) (IGC)
(IC) is the incentive constraint that mass " of consumers prefer to buy than to wait given
that mass N ￿ " buy in S1(Q;p1)
￿ ￿ p1 ￿ U2(max(0;Q ￿ N + ");N ￿ Q + ") (IC)
(IC) is not really constraining. It holds for any p1 ￿ ￿ as long as Q ￿ N ￿ ". Finally,
let e ￿MC = max
￿




fq(p1 ￿ M); s:t: (CT);
(IGC); (IC)g where for presentation’s sake I assume that the maximum is unique.
Proposition 2: Every equilibrium is a buying frenzy equilibrium if and only if q￿(p￿
1 ￿
M) > e ￿MC (C1), holds.
Proof: The ‘if’ part of the proposition proceeds in three steps.
Claim 1: There is no asymmetric continuation equilibrium in any S1(Q;p1) where 0 <
n1 < Q ￿ N consumers buy early. In any asymmetric continuation equilibrium,
U2(Q ￿ n1;N ￿ n1) ￿ ￿ ￿ p1 ￿ U2(Q ￿ n1 + e ";N ￿ n1 + e "):
5since mass e " 2 [0;"] of consumer may jointly deviate. But U2 increases with "
dU2
d"
(Q ￿ n1 + ";N ￿ n1 + ") =
N ￿ Q
(N ￿ n1 + ")2










Claim 2: For any ￿ > 0 there exists a unique continuation equilibrium in S1(q￿;p￿
1 ￿ ￿).
Consider the continuation buying frenzy equilibrium where r1 = p￿
1, p2 = p2(q￿ ￿n1;N ￿
n1) if n1 consumers wait, and r2 = p2. (IC) implies that r1 is a best reply for any
mass e " 2 [0;"] of consumers. The only other possible continuation equilibrium is that all
consumers wait which is ruled out by (IGC).
Claim 3: There is no market clearing equilibrium. A lower bound on pro￿ts is q￿(p￿
1￿M).
(C1) implies that the highest possible pro￿ts under any market clearing equilibrium are
dominated by q￿(p￿
1 ￿ M). Therefore market clearing cannot be part of an equilibrium.
The ‘only if’ part is proved by contradiction. Assume (C1) does not hold and consider
the market clearing equilibrium with equilibrium strategy pro￿le Q = N, p1 = p2 = vL,
k = 1 i￿ w ￿ Qp2(Q;N), r1 > r2 = vL and for any initial announcement (Q;p1) 6= (N;vL)
r1(Q;p1) =
￿
￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U2(Q;N) if w ￿ Qp2(Q;N)
￿ ￿ U2(Q;N) if w < Qp2(Q;N)
;
k = 1 i￿ w ￿ Qp2(Q;N), and r2 = p2(Q;N). Consumer decisions are optimal. If w ￿
Qp2(Q;N) they rationally anticipate that the project will be cancelled with probability
￿ and are better o￿ waiting if p1 > ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)U2(Q;N). If w < Qp2(Q;N) the project
is never cancelled and consumers are better o￿ waiting if p1 > ￿ ￿ U2(Q;N). Given
consumer responses, the highest possible pro￿ts under any deviation is q￿(p￿
1 ￿M) which
is dominated by e ￿MC if (C1) is violated.2
The set of equilibrium under (C1) is any (Q;p1) such that Q(p1 ￿ M) ￿ q￿(p￿
1 ￿ M),
(IC) holds, and the continuation equilibrium is a buying frenzy. Propositions 1 ￿ 2
imply that the monopolist must receive an outside option with non-negative probability
to eliminate the market clearing equilibrium. The outside option reduces consumers’
utility from waiting and increases the price the monopolist can charge early. (The price
p1 that satis￿es (IGC) increases as ￿ increases.) If ￿ = 1 and w ￿ NvL, the monopolist
extracts almost all consumer surplus (pro￿ts are no less than (N ￿ ￿)(￿ ￿ M)).
If (C1) does not hold, then there is no safe buying frenzy equilibrium. If (C1) holds,
there is a unique safe buying frenzy equilibrium (q￿;p￿
1). Consider the possibility of
6rationing in the safe buying frenzy equilibrium. To rule out the uninteresting case where
rationing occurs because (IC) binds, I say that rationing occurs if q￿ < N ￿ ￿. Let
(q￿￿;p￿￿
1 ) = argmax
q;p1
fq(p1 ￿ M) s.t. (IGC); (IC)g.
Proposition 3: Assume ￿ is small. Rationing occurs in the safe buying frenzy equilibrium
if (C1) holds and either ￿￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)[vL ￿ 1
f(vL)] ￿ M < 0 (C2), or w < q￿￿p2(q￿￿;N)
(C3), hold.
















dq￿(N) = ￿￿+(1￿￿)[vL ￿ 1
f(vL)]￿M < 0 and by continuity d
dq￿(N ￿￿) < 0 for ￿ small
enough. If (C3) holds then q￿ < q￿￿ ￿ N. For ￿ small enough q￿ < N ￿ ￿.2
If ￿ = 1, (C2) cannot hold. If w is large (C3) cannot hold. Therefore, rationing can
occur only if the outside option is uncertain or low.
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Period 1 Period 2
e-Monopolist receives outside offer
f-Consumers learn valuations
g-Monopolist sets k and p2
h-Consumers set r2
i-Consumers are served